



U.S. Department of
Transportation

BUDGET ESTIMATES

FISCAL YEAR 2026

OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBMITTED FOR THE USE OF
THE COMMITTEES ON APPROPRIATIONS

Office of Inspector General
Fiscal Year 2026 Budget Estimates

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N/A

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N/A

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N/A

Section 1: Overview

ADMINISTRATOR’S OVERVIEW FOR THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

The Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Office of Inspector General (OIG) requests \$116.5 million to support an estimated 382 full-time equivalents (FTEs) in fiscal year (FY) 2026. We estimate we can support another 13 FTEs with funding from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021 (IIJA) for an estimated total of 395 FTEs in FY 2026.

This request includes current services level adjustments for an annualization of a 2025 pay raise of 2 percent, a 2026 pay raise of 0 percent, General Services Administration (GSA) rent estimates, and DOT Working Capital Fund (WCF) estimates.

Since the Inspector General Act of 1978 established Federal offices of inspectors general, DOT-OIG has been dedicated to providing independent, objective reviews of the efficiency and effectiveness of DOT’s programs and operations. In FY 2024, we issued 41 audit reports with 186 recommendations, and our investigations resulted in 74 convictions and 82 indictments¹. Our work led to substantial financial and program improvements in safety and other areas, as well as significant returns on taxpayer investments. From FY 2020 through FY 2024, we achieved an average return on investment (ROI)² of \$26 to \$1.

Inspector General Act Statement

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. § 406), requires certain information about budget submissions. In accordance with the act, we submit the following information:

- Our initial request to DOT in 2024 was \$127.2 million, \$127.2 million was received. Our request to the Office of Management and Budget was \$127.2 million, \$116.5 million was received.
- The amount included in this request to fund external training courses is \$750,000.
- The amount included in this request to support the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency is \$466,000.

¹ Results for investigations may differ slightly from the Semiannual Reports to Congress due to delays in final judicial reporting.

² ROI calculations compare our cost to do business to the revenue and other savings generated through court-ordered fines, restitutions, recoveries, forfeitures, recoveries of improper payments, recommended cost savings, and recommendations for funds put to better use.

EXHIBIT I-A
FY 2025 ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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



EXHIBIT I-B
FY 2026 ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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Section 2: Budget Summary Tables

EXHIBIT II-1
FY 2026 BUDGET AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
(\$000)

ACCOUNT NAME	M / D	FY 2024 ACTUAL	FY 2025 ENACTED	FY 2026 BASELINE ESTIMATES	FY 2026 PROGRAM CHANGES	FY 2026 PRES. BUD.
SALARIES & EXPENSES	D	\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452	\$ -	\$ 116,452
Rescissions		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Transfers		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Offsets		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Gross New Budget Authority		\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452	\$ -	\$ 116,452
Rescissions		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Transfers		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Offsets		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
NET NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY REQUESTED:		<u>\$ 116,452</u>	<u>\$ 116,452</u>	<u>\$ 116,452</u>	<u>\$ -</u>	<u>\$ 116,452</u>
[Mandatory BA]						
[Discretionary BA]		\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452	\$ -	\$ 116,452
Supplemental Funding						
COVID-19 Supplementals		<u>\$ -</u>	<u>\$ -</u>	<u>\$ -</u>	<u>\$ -</u>	<u>\$ -</u>
CARES Act		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
IIJA Supplemental (Division J)		<u>\$ 4,324</u>	<u>\$ 4,314</u>	<u>\$ 4,314</u>	<u>\$ -</u>	<u>\$ 4,314</u>
Transfers From Other Accounts		\$ 4,324	\$ 4,314	\$ 4,314	\$ -	\$ 4,314
Grand Total, All Appropriations		<u><u>\$ 120,776</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 120,766</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 120,766</u></u>	<u><u>\$ -</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 120,766</u></u>

EXHIBIT II-2
FY 2026 TOTAL BUDGETARY RESOURCES BY APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Appropriations, Obligation Limitations, and Exempt Obligations
(\$000)

ACCOUNT NAME	M / D	FY 2024 ACTUAL	FY 2025 ENACTED	FY 2026 BASELINE ESTIMATES	FY 2026 PROGRAM CHANGES	FY 2026 PRES. BUD.
SALARIES & EXPENSES	D	\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452	\$ -	\$ 116,452
Rescissions		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Transfers		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Offsets		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Gross New Budgetary Resources		\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452	\$ -	\$ 116,452
Rescissions		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Transfers		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Offsets		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
TOTAL BUDGETARY RESOURCES:		<u>\$ 116,452</u>	<u>\$ 116,452</u>	<u>\$ 116,452</u>	<u>\$ -</u>	<u>\$ 116,452</u>
[Mandatory]						
[Discretionary]		\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452	\$ -	\$ 116,452
[Obligation Limitation]						
Supplemental Funding						
COVID-19 Supplementals		\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
CARES Act		\$ -	\$ -			
IIJA Supplemental (Division J)		\$ 4,324	\$ 4,314	\$ 4,314	\$ -	\$ 4,314
Transfers From Other Accounts		\$ 4,324	\$ 4,314	\$ 4,314	\$ -	\$ 4,314
Grand Total, All Appropriations		<u>\$ 120,776</u>	<u>\$ 120,766</u>	<u>\$ 120,766</u>	<u>\$ -</u>	<u>\$ 120,766</u>

EXHIBIT II-4
FY 2026 OUTLAYS
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
(\$000)

	(A)	(B)	(C)
	FY 2024	FY 2025	FY 2026
	ACTUAL	ENACTED	PRES. BUD.
M / D			
D			
SALARIES & EXPENSES	\$ 107,839	\$ 122,591	\$ 116,452
TOTAL:	<u><u>\$ 107,839</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 122,591</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 116,452</u></u>
Mandatory			
Discretionary			
Supplemental Funding			
COVID-19 Supplementals			
CARES Act	\$ 505	0	0
IIJA Supplemental (Division J)			
Transfer From Other Accounts	0	\$ 3,250	\$ 3,450
Emergency Disaster Relief Oversight			
Disaster Relief Appropriations Act	\$ 158	0	0
Grand Total, Outlays from all Appropriations	<u><u>\$ 108,502</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 125,841</u></u>	<u><u>\$ 119,902</u></u>

EXHIBIT II-5
SUMMARY OF REQUESTED FUNDING CHANGES FROM BASE
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Appropriations, Obligation Limitations, and Exempt Obligations
(\$000)

	Baseline Changes											
	FY 2024 Actual	FY 2025 Enacted	Annualization of Prior Pay Raises	Annualization of new FY 2025 FTE	FY 2026 Pay Raises	Adjustment for Compensable Days (261 days)	GSA Rent	WCF Increase/ Decrease	Inflation and other adjustments to base	FY 2026 Baseline Estimate	Program Increases/ Decreases	FY 2026 Pres. Budget
Salaries & Expenses												
PERSONNEL RESOURCES (FTE)	384	382								382	0	382
Direct FTE - Annual funding	382	382								382	0	382
Direct FTE - CARES Act	2	0								0	0	0
Direct FTE -Disaster Relief Approps. Act (DRAA)	0	0								0	0	0
FINANCIAL RESOURCES												
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES												
Salaries and Benefits	\$87,660	\$89,600	\$394	\$0	\$0	\$0				\$89,994		\$89,994
Travel	\$2,265	\$2,140								\$2,140		\$2,140
Transportation	\$5	\$5								\$5		\$5
GSA Rent	\$1,825	\$1,905					\$56			\$1,961		\$1,961
Communications, & Utilities	\$435	\$275								\$275		\$275
Printing	\$0	\$0								\$0		\$0
Other Services:	\$11,474	\$12,743							(\$450)	\$12,293		\$12,293
-WCF	\$10,508	\$7,704								\$7,704		\$7,704
Supplies	\$275	\$275								\$275		\$275
Equipment	\$1,525	\$1,325								\$1,325		\$1,325
Land & Structures	\$450	\$450								\$450		\$450
Insurance Claims and Indemnities	\$10	\$10								\$10		\$10
Unvouchered	\$20	\$20								\$20		\$20
Admin Subtotal	\$116,452	\$116,452	\$394	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$56	\$0	(\$450)	\$116,452	\$0	\$116,452
BASE PROGRAMS TOTAL	\$116,452	\$116,452	\$394	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$56	\$0	(\$450)	\$116,452	\$0	\$116,452

EXHIBIT II-5a
SUMMARY OF IIJA SUPPLEMENTAL (DIVISION J) BUDGET OBLIGATIONS OVER FISCAL YEARS
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Appropriations, Obligation Limitations, and Exempt Obligations
(\$000)

Salaries & Expenses	FY 2024	FY 2025	FY 2026
Unobligated Carryforward Balance, start of FY (+)	\$8,648	\$12,972	\$14,036
FY Advance Appropriations (Budget Authority)* (+)	\$4,324	\$4,314	\$4,314
FY Planned Obligations (-)	\$0	(\$3,250)	(\$3,450)
Unobligated Balance, end of FY (+)	\$12,972	\$14,036	\$14,900

Planned Obligations by Fiscal Year

PERSONNEL RESOURCES (FTE)

Direct FTE - IIJA	0	13	13
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FINANCIAL RESOURCES

ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

Salaries and Benefits	\$0	\$3,250	\$3,450
Travel			
Transportation			
GSA Rent			
Communications, & Utilities			
Printing			
Other Services:			
-WCF			
Supplies			
Equipment			
Insurance Claims and Indemnities			
Unvouchered			
Admin Subtotal	\$0	\$3,250	\$3,450
IIJA/IRA TOTAL	\$0	\$3,250	\$3,450

* Transfers From Other Accounts

EXHIBIT II-6
WORKING CAPITAL FUND
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
(\$000)

	FY 2024 ACTUAL	FY 2025 ENACTED	FY 2026 PRES. BUD.
DIRECT:			
Salaries & Expenses	\$ 10,508	\$ 7,704	\$ 7,704
SUBTOTAL	\$ 10,508	\$ 7,704	\$ 7,704
REIMBURSABLE:			
Salaries & Expenses	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
SUBTOTAL	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
TOTAL, Base programs	\$ 10,508	\$ 7,704	\$ 7,704
<u>SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING</u>			
COVID-19 Supplementals Subtotal	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
CARES Act			
IIJA Supplemental (Division J) Subtotal	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Transfer From Other Accounts			
Total, All Sources	\$ 10,508	\$ 7,704	\$ 7,704

EXHIBIT II-7
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
PERSONNEL RESOURCE -- SUMMARY
TOTAL FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS

	<u>FY 2024</u> <u>ACTUAL</u>	<u>FY 2025</u> <u>ENACTED</u>	<u>FY 2026</u> <u>PRES. BUD.</u>
<u>DIRECT FUNDED BY APPROPRIATION</u>			
Salaries & Expenses	382	382	382
SUBTOTAL, DIRECT FUNDED	382	382	382
<u>REIMBURSEMENTS / ALLOCATIONS / OTHER</u>			
Reimbursements and 'Other'			
Salaries & Expenses	0	0	0
Allocations from other Organizations			
Salaries & Expenses	0	0	0
SUBTOTAL, REIMBURSE./ALLOC./OTH.	0	0	0
BASE TOTAL FTEs	382	382	382
<u>SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDED FTEs</u>			
COVID-19 Supplemental funding			
CARES Act	2	0	0
IIJA Supplemental Funding			
Transfer From Other Accounts	0	13	13
Emergency Disaster Relief Oversight			
Disaster Relief Appropriations Act	0	0	0
SUBTOTAL, Supplemental Funded	2	13	13
TOTAL FTEs	384	395	395

EXHIBIT II-8
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
RESOURCE SUMMARY – STAFFING
FULL-TIME PERMANENT POSITIONS

	<u>FY 2024 ACTUAL</u>	<u>FY 2025 ENACTED</u>	<u>FY 2026 PRES. BUD.</u>
<u>DIRECT FUNDED BY APPROPRIATION</u>			
Salaries and Expenses	380	392	392
SUBTOTAL, DIRECT FUNDED	<u>380</u>	<u>392</u>	<u>392</u>
<u>REIMBURSEMENTS/ALLOCATIONS/OTHER</u>			
Reimbursements and 'Other'			
Salaries and Expenses	0	0	0
Allocations from other Organizations			
Salaries and Expenses	0	0	0
SUBTOTAL, REIMBURSE./ALLOC./OTH.	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
BASE TOTAL POSITIONS	<u>380</u>	<u>392</u>	<u>392</u>
<u>SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDED FTPs</u>			
COVID-19 Supplemental funding			
CARE Act	2	0	0
IIJA Supplemental Funding			
Transfers From Other Accounts	0	13	13
Emergency Disaster Relief Oversight			
Disaster Relief Appropriations Act	0	0	0
SUBTOTAL, Supplemental Funded	<u>2</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>13</u>
TOTAL POSITIONS	<u>382</u>	<u>405</u>	<u>405</u>

Section 3: Budget Request by Appropriation

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

Appropriations Language

For necessary expenses of the Office of the Inspector General to carry out the provisions of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, *\$116,452,000: Provided*, That the Inspector General shall have all necessary authority, in carrying out the duties specified in the Inspector General Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), to investigate allegations of fraud, including false statements to the government (18 U.S.C. 1001), by any person or entity that is subject to regulation by the Department of Transportation: *Provided further*, That none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Office of Inspector General by this Act or prior Acts may be used to implement the requirements of section 5274 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263).

EXHIBIT III-1
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
SALARIES & EXPENSES
Summary by Program Activity
Appropriations, Obligation Limitations, and Exempt Obligations
(\$000)

	<u>FY 2024 ACTUAL</u>	<u>FY 2025 ENACTED</u>	<u>FY 2026 PRES. BUD.</u>
Salaries & Expenses	\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452	\$ 116,452
TOTAL, Base appropriations	<u>\$ 116,452</u>	<u>\$ 116,452</u>	<u>\$ 116,452</u>
FTEs			
Direct Funded	382	382	382
Reimbursable, allocated, other			
<u>Supplemental Funding</u>			
COVID-19 Supplementals	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
CARES ACT			
IIJA Supplemental (Division J)	\$ 4,324	\$ 4,314	\$ 4,314
Transfer From Other Accounts			
Emergency Disaster Relief Oversight			
Disaster Relief Appropriations Act	\$ -	\$ -	
TOTAL, Base appropriations	<u>\$ 4,324</u>	<u>\$ 4,314</u>	<u>\$ 4,314</u>
FTEs			
COVID-19 Supplementals			
CARES ACT	2	0	0
IIJA Supplemental (Division J)			
Transfer From Other Accounts	0	13	13
Emergency Disaster Relief Oversight			
Disaster Relief Appropriations Act	0	0	0
SUBTOTAL, Supplemental FTEs	2	13	13
Account	<u>\$ 120,776</u>	<u>\$ 120,766</u>	<u>\$ 120,766</u>

Program and Performance Statement

The Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducts independent audits, investigations, and evaluations to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the management and administration of DOT programs and operations, including contracts, grants, and financial management; and to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in such activities. This appropriation provides funds to enable the Office of Inspector General to perform these oversight responsibilities in accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Ch. 4). DOT OIG requests language to prohibit the use of any OIG resources to implement the requirements of section 5274 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263).

EXHIBIT III-1a
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
SALARIES & EXPENSES
SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF CHANGE FROM FY 2025 TO FY 2026
Appropriations, Obligations, Limitations, and Exempt Obligations
(\$000)

	<u>\$000</u>	<u>FTE</u>
FY 2025 ENACTED	<u>116,452</u>	<u>382</u>
ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE:		
Annualization of Prior Pay Raise(s)	394	
Annualization of FY 2025 FTE	0	
FY 2026 Pay Raise	0	
GSA Rent	56	
Working Capital Fund	0	
Inflation and other adjustments to base	(450)	
SUBTOTAL, ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE	0	0
PROGRAM REDUCTIONS:		
SUBTOTAL, PROGRAM REDUCTIONS	0	0
PROGRAM INCREASES:		
SUBTOTAL, PROGRAM INCREASES	0	0
FY 2026 REQUEST	116,452	382
Supplemental Appropriations	4,314	13
TOTAL	120,766	395

**DETAILED JUSTIFICATION FOR
THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**FY 2026 Office of Inspector General Budget Request
(\$000)**

Program Activity	FY 2024 Actual	FY 2025 Enacted	FY 2026 Pres. Budget
Salaries and Expenses	\$116,452	\$116,452	\$116,452
TOTAL	\$116,452	\$116,452	\$116,452
FTEs	382	382	382
Supplemental-funded FTEs	2	13	13
Total FTEs	384	395	395

DOT-OIG requests \$116.5 million to support an estimated 382 FTEs in FY 2026. We estimate we can support another 13 FTEs with funding from IIJA for an estimated total of 395 FTEs in FY 2026.

This request includes current services level adjustments for an annualization of a 2025 pay raise of 2 percent, a 2026 pay raise of 0 percent, GSA rent estimates, and DOT WCF estimates.

What is the program and what does this funding level support?

Our office employs a highly trained, specialized workforce to conduct audits, investigations, and other administrative and enforcement activities. Since Congress established Federal offices of inspectors general in 1978, we have been dedicated to fulfilling our unique role as DOT's only in-house source for objective examinations of departmental programs.

The Inspector General (IG) Act of 1978, as amended, requires offices of inspectors general to:

- conduct independent audits and investigations;
- promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness;
- prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse;
- refer criminal violations to the Attorney General for prosecution;
- review pending legislation and regulations; and
- keep the Secretary and Congress fully and currently informed.

We are committed to fulfilling our statutory responsibilities under the IG Act while supporting DOT's mission and the Secretary's strategic goals and priorities, especially those concerning transportation safety and investments in infrastructure. Our work helps the Department and its Operating Administrations meet the performance targets identified in their strategic goals. Our

5-year strategic plan aligns with the Department's mission and describes the goals, strategies, related risks, and performance measures we have identified to help us achieve our mission.

To maximize our audit resources and provide the greatest possible benefits to the Department and the public, we have a comprehensive 24-month tactical audit plan that we update annually. As part of this plan, we maintain a catalogue of possible audit areas that we develop from reviews of DOT budget data, business plans, performance reports, Operating Administration websites, and publications. For the current 24-month period, we plan to initiate 94 audits in critical areas across the Department.

To maximize our investigative resources, ensure effective resource allocation, and deliver meaningful results to the Department and the public, we review our investigative priorities annually. These reviews give us the flexibility to address emerging regional and national trends, and tackle issues of high interest to the Department, Congress, and the public. In general, we prioritize cases involving public safety, procurement and grant fraud, employee integrity, and cases in the public interest.

Each year, we issue a report on DOT's top management challenges that presents our assessment of the Department's management and operations, and identifies issues that require the most immediate attention to minimize financial and safety risks. For FY 2025, we identified the following top management challenge areas:

- **Aviation safety.** Key challenges: strengthen the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) ability to identify and resolve Boeing production issues; and improve data analysis and implement initiatives to identify root causes, prevent aviation close calls, and sustain the aviation safety track record.
- **Surface transportation safety.** Key challenges: partner with recipients and the private sector to improve the safety of drivers, passengers, and workers; and enhance verification and enforcement of safety compliance.
- **Aviation governance and modernization.** Key challenges: refine air traffic controller staffing, placement, and training practices to meet facility needs and maintain safety in an evolving operational environment; keep the deployment of Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) systems and capabilities on track while FAA terminates the Office of NextGen; and improve processes for collecting and analyzing flight delay and cancellation data and consumer complaint data to oversee airlines and protect consumers.
- **Surface transportation infrastructure.** Key challenges: evaluate the progress of surface transportation programs; continue to strengthen oversight of Federal transportation investments; and provide support in a dynamic surface transportation sector.
- **Grant and contract fund stewardship.** Key challenges: make sound, transparent grant and contract award decisions; and confirm grant and contract funds are used as intended.
- **Financial management.** Key challenges: improve stewardship of agency-owned and federally funded property; improve compliance with Federal requirements for monitoring

and reporting on grantee spending; and improve compliance with Federal requirements for managing and expending Federal funds.

- **Information security.** Key challenges: address longstanding weaknesses to protect DOT's critical information systems; and execute key cybersecurity initiatives to strengthen DOT's effectiveness addressing transportation-sector cybersecurity matters.
- **Transportation transformation.** Key challenges: integrate new technologies into the National Airspace System; and facilitate innovation by supporting stakeholders in their safe adoption of new technologies.
- **Organizational excellence.** Key challenges: hire, train, and retain the workforce necessary to meet Department goals; manage workforce and property assets and facilities in an evolving environment; and address longstanding organizational issues.

We will continue to leverage the institutional knowledge of our staff—our most valuable resource for achieving our mission—and execute the work identified in our tactical audit plans and investigative priorities. These plans and priorities provide the general framework we use to focus our resources across the Department and its Operating Administrations on the following topics:

Departmentwide

- Assess DOT's oversight of financial and procurement-related issues, such as managing risks related to information systems and reviewing grant reimbursements from the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority.
- Review departmental cybersecurity, financial statements, and improper payments.
- Review departmental and Operating Administration oversight of funding from IIJA and Hurricane Sandy emergency relief.
- Conduct outreach activities to enhance fraud prevention awareness and generate investigative referrals from departmental, State, and local stakeholders regarding procurement and grant fraud.
- Investigate fraud, waste, and abuse of departmental IIJA and COVID-19 relief funding.

Federal Aviation Administration

- Assess FAA's information technology (IT) infrastructure, personal identity verification card controls, and National Drug Control policies.
- Assess air traffic controller skills assessments, training, and decision support tools, including FAA's progress reviewing and revising an air traffic controller applicant pre-employment test and implementing time-based flow management for high altitude traffic.
- Assess aviation safety, including FAA's oversight of repair stations, organization designation authorization, and aircraft manufacturers' supplier controls.
- Evaluate FAA's process for inspecting and certifying airports and determining the impact of spectrum reallocation on the National Airspace System.

- Investigate the sale of unapproved aircraft parts, falsified commercial airman certificates, crimes involving drones such as the smuggling of contraband into prisons and destruction of law enforcement drones, and illegal air shipments of hazardous materials.
- Investigate false statements provided to FAA by aircraft manufacturers and suppliers.

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)

- Evaluate FHWA's oversight of bridge safety, including critical findings related to structural or safety deficiencies, and the use of risk-based approaches to project oversight and stewardship and oversight agreements.
- Assess FHWA's oversight of IIJA funds for the Transportation Asset Management Plan requirements for the National Highway Performance Program, Local Public Agencies, including discretionary grant recipients.
- Investigate deceptive practices in FHWA-funded projects, such as product substitution, overbilling, bid rigging, bribery, substandard work, cost mischarging, and fraud related to disadvantaged business enterprises (DBE).
- Investigate fraud, waste, and abuse in over \$365 billion IIJA-funded FHWA projects involving Federal, State, tribal, local organizations, contractors, and subcontractors.

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)

- Assess FMCSA's oversight of its drug and alcohol clearinghouse, high-risk carriers, and States' compliance with Federal standards for commercial drivers' knowledge and skills testing.
- Investigate violations of FMCSA's regulations governing interstate transportation of household goods to protect consumers and workers from fraudulent and deceptive practices.
- Investigate motor carrier safety violations, such as unsafe transport of hazardous materials; commercial driver's license fraud by schools, third-party testers, and medical examiners; and carriers that reincarnate with different identities to circumvent safety regulations and penalties.

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)

- Evaluate FRA's oversight of rail tank car safety and certification of railroads' implementation of positive train control systems.
- Assess FRA's implementation of the IIJA-funded Federal-State Partnership for Intercity Passenger Rail Grant Program.
- Investigate illegal shipments of hazardous materials, violations of rail safety regulations, and fraud on FRA-funded projects.

Federal Transit Administration (FTA)

- Assess FTA's oversight of IIJA-funded programs and projects.
- Assess FTA's oversight of grants for buses and bus facilities, and triennial and State management review processes.
- Investigate FTA-funded projects, focusing on issues such as product substitution, overbilling, bribery, substandard work, cost mischarging, and fraud related to DBEs.
- Investigate fraud, waste, and abuse in FTA projects funded with over \$107 billion from IIJA appropriations.

Maritime Administration (MARAD)

- Assess MARAD's controls for awards and oversight of its IIJA-funded Port Infrastructure Development Program grants, and the Agency's oversight of recipients' compliance with Federal contracting requirements for US Marine Highways Program funds.
- Assess MARAD's oversight of financial assistance payments to State maritime academies and management controls for statutory responsibilities.
- Investigate fraud, waste, and abuse of MARAD-funded projects, as well as employee integrity matters at the United States Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA).

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)

- Evaluate NHTSA's efforts to improve pedestrian and bicycle safety and assess NHTSA's effectiveness in overseeing safety research funding.
- Investigate possible fraud in NHTSA grant programs and allegations of false statements to NHTSA by automobile manufacturers and suppliers to the automotive industry.
- Investigate illegal importation of counterfeit airbags, seatbelts, and other safety regulated equipment.

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)

- Evaluate PHMSA's oversight of grant fund payments for pipeline safety and progress working with FRA to implement tank car safety requirements.
- Investigate fraud that may impact PHMSA's programs, including pipeline safety, cylinder retesting, shipments of hazardous materials, and DOT-required hazardous materials' packaging and marking.

The following are examples of OIG's recently issued audit reports and results of criminal investigations that demonstrate the impact of our work in relation to the Department's strategic objectives and major programs, and our ability to provide timely and relevant oversight of emerging issues.

Departmentwide

DOT Is Taking Steps To Manage and Secure Its Mobile Devices, but Further Actions Are Needed (issued February 14, 2025)

Many Federal employees use mobile devices, such as smart phones, to access their agencies' networks and systems, including devices that process sensitive information. These devices can leave sensitive data vulnerable to cybersecurity threats and malicious software. Given increased use of mobile devices by DOT personnel and the cybersecurity risks associated with this use, we initiated this audit. Our objective was to determine whether DOT has established and implemented effective controls to secure and manage its mobile devices. As part of our review of DOT's mobile device management, we also assessed DOT's processes for maintaining an inventory of mobile devices and monitoring the costs of their use.

We found DOT is taking steps to secure its mobile devices but has not yet implemented sufficient controls to effectively secure and manage all devices. DOT's Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), FAA, USMMA, and OIG have begun implementing user and device authentication and data protection controls for their use of mobile devices. However, FAA and USMMA have not rapidly adopted software updates to ensure mobile operating systems are configured securely. FAA and USMMA do not always restrict the use of mobile applications and do not have effective policies and procedures to manage and secure their mobile devices. In addition, OCIO and USMMA have not addressed security control weaknesses for their mobile device management solutions. Additionally, FAA has not maintained accurate inventories, and OCIO and FAA have not ensured efficient spending for mobile devices. Accurate inventories and monitoring of spending help agencies maintain efficient mobile device management. However, FAA did not maintain accurate inventories of its mobile devices. We found 157 personally owned mobile devices that had been granted access to FAA's network resources that FAA did not report to us when we took inventory. OCIO and FAA did not have effective controls in place to ensure efficient spending on mobile devices and services. We found that FAA and OCIO spent funds on many mobile devices with zero usage, resulting in up to \$422,838 by FAA and up to \$203,884 by OCIO in funds that could be put to better use.

We made six recommendations to improve DOT's process for managing and securing mobile devices within DOT's enterprise.

DOT Can Improve Workforce Planning Procedures and Metrics for Estimating Needs and Assessing Capacity To Deliver IIJA Programs (issued February 5, 2025)

In 2022, DOT established a goal to hire more than 1,400 employees in its surface transportation Operating Administrations and the Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) to respond to IIJA-related surface transportation workforce needs between fiscal years 2022 and 2026. Successful IIJA program implementation relies in part on DOT's maintenance of an appropriately skilled workforce. Accordingly, we initiated this audit to

assess DOT's estimation of its workforce needs. Our objectives were to (1) evaluate surface transportation Operating Administrations' processes for identifying positions needed to implement new and expanded IJIA programs and (2) report on those Operating Administrations' progress toward addressing identified IJIA staffing needs.

Surface transportation Operating Administrations and OST can improve planning processes and better incorporate data-analytic methods for estimating IJIA workforce needs. Despite a requirement to plan for and manage workforce needs and update hiring goals, most Operating Administrations and OST did not document policies and procedures for estimating IJIA workforce needs or for updating ongoing hiring estimates. Furthermore, Federal regulations require Federal agencies to use comprehensive data-analytic methods for workforce planning. However, two Operating Administrations and OST did not employ such methods. Additionally, surface transportation Operating Administrations and OST reported filling most IJIA target positions, but DOT's hiring metrics do not accurately reflect onboard workforce capability. As of May 2024, DOT reported filling 1,204 new IJIA positions. Surface transportation Operating Administrations and OST initially set a goal to hire 1,403 employees by the end of fiscal year 2026. As of September 2024, several Operating Administrations and OST had adjusted their targets, bringing the total new-hire target to 1,638. DOT tracks and reports to the Office of Personnel Management the number of selections it has made for those positions. However, these data may not accurately reflect whether new positions are currently filled or whether DOT has progressed in meeting its IJIA workforce capacity goals because the number of reported selections includes all individuals who received an employment offer—even if those individuals are not yet working, leave the Agency after starting employment, or transfer internally from a non-IJIA position.

We made two recommendations to improve DOT's processes for estimating its workforce needs.

The Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) Verifies the Accuracy of Flight Delay and Cancellation Data but Can Do More To Assess Its Completeness and Consistency (issued October 23, 2024)

Flight disruptions, including flight delays and cancellations, are a part of many passengers' experiences. Air carriers are required to submit to BTS on-time performance data—such as departure and arrival times, elapsed flight times, and minutes of delay—as well as the reported causes of any delayed or canceled flights. Accurate reporting of these data is important for DOT to understand the causes of delays and cancellations and take actions to protect consumers. Our objective was to assess the controls BTS has in place to ensure the completeness and accuracy of data for on-time performance and reported causes of delays and cancellations.

We found that BTS relies on informal procedures to verify the accuracy of on-time performance data and lacks procedures to verify the data's completeness. BTS has established informal quality control procedures to identify inaccuracies in on-time performance data submitted by reporting carriers. For example, BTS developed an automated process that performs 117 automated checks of the data to identify errors and inconsistencies. However, BTS has not yet formally adopted these procedures or established a plan to ensure continued execution. While BTS requires reporting carriers to certify that the on-time performance information they submit is correct and complete, the Agency does not have a

method for verifying that carriers are reporting data for all flights, raising concerns about the data's reliability. Additionally, we found that BTS lacks effective guidance and procedures for verifying data on reported causes. BTS' technical directives, which provide guidance to carriers on reporting the causes of flight delays and cancellations, lack clarity, leading air carriers to interpret the guidance and report their data inconsistently. BTS lacks procedures to identify and address inconsistencies in the data on reported causes. Instead, the Agency relies on methods the air carriers use to ensure submitted data are accurate. We found a high rate of disagreement between data from FAA on reported causes and the data that carriers report to BTS. BTS has not taken steps to understand and address the causes of these discrepancies.

We made seven recommendations to improve the completeness and consistency of data on on-time performance and reported causes.

Federal Aviation Administration

FAA Has Taken Steps To Prevent and Mitigate Runway Incursions, but Work Remains To Improve Data Analytics and Implement Key Initiatives (issued March 12, 2025)

In early 2023, a series of incidents at large commercial airports occurred in which aircraft came close to each other on runways. FAA has taken various actions in response to these incursions, such as holding a safety summit and granting over \$200 million to airports for runway incursion mitigation, but challenges persist. Our objective was to assess FAA's (1) processes for analyzing data and identifying risks associated with runway incursions and (2) actions for preventing and mitigating runway incursions at primary commercial service airports. The audit focused on FAA's processes for analyzing runway incursion data and its efforts to prevent and mitigate serious runway incursions (Category A and B) at primary commercial airports since the beginning of fiscal year 2022.

We found that FAA lacks an integrated approach for analyzing runway incursion data and identifying risks. Runway incursion data are mainly used to conduct analyses to prevent and mitigate runway incursions at individual airports. FAA does not have all causal data available for analysis or always share data freely across the Agency, preventing the Agency from conducting full-scale analyses and developing corresponding mitigations. FAA concluded that a review of Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing data did not provide additional context to determine whether there were indicators of emerging trends regarding runway incursions. Additionally, we found that while FAA has taken some actions to mitigate runway incursions, the Agency has yet to implement several key initiatives. FAA is in the process of deploying and finalizing mitigations, most notably deploying new airport surface surveillance and other safety technologies. In response to the 2023 string of runway incursion incidents, FAA acted to further aviation safety awareness, held discussions with stakeholders, and continued with long-standing mitigation practices. An independent Safety Review Team issued 24 recommendations in November 2023 in the areas of process integrity, staffing, facilities, equipment, and technology. FAA has only implemented five of these recommendations as of October 2024.

We made five recommendations to improve FAA's ability to share data among its organizations and to provide stakeholders with pertinent information for preventing and mitigating runway incursions.

FAA Has Improved Its Oversight of COVID-19 Relief Funds Despite Implementation Inconsistencies (issued March 12, 2025)

The Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act (CRRSA Act) and the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) awarded \$10 billion in economic relief to eligible U.S. airports and concessions at those airports to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. By the end of December 2023, FAA had expended more than \$8.5 billion in concession rent relief and economic relief grants. We previously identified weaknesses in FAA's policies and procedures for monitoring COVID-19 relief funds. Because of those weaknesses, we initiated this audit. Our objective was to assess FAA's oversight of airport sponsors' compliance with CRRSA Act and ARPA rent relief and economic relief reimbursement eligibility requirements.

We found that FAA's revised policies have resulted in greater adherence to reimbursement requirements. Our previous review of FAA's oversight of the COVID-19 relief grant funds determined that the Agency's oversight process regarding supporting documentation impacted its ability to monitor program performance. During that review, we identified \$271 million in unsupported costs, \$85 million in questioned costs, and \$3 million in improper payments. We recommended that FAA assess the risk of improper payments for different types of Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) reimbursement requests and revise its policy on supporting documentation requirements to account for risk level. In response, FAA revised its COVID grant programs guidance, effective March 27, 2023. With these changes, FAA significantly reduced unsupported and questioned costs, as well as improper payments. Additionally, we found FAA inconsistently implemented the CRRSA Act and ARPA rent relief programs. For airport sponsors to receive rent relief funds, FAA required the sponsors to complete a concession plan. We found that FAA approved 76 percent of concession plans for the Airport Coronavirus Response Grant Program (ACRGP) and 70 percent for the Airport Rescue Grants Program (ARGP). In our review of 60 plans, we found some inconsistencies in the program's implementation and an error in FAA's review, including a nonprofit business' receipt of rent relief, inconsistent application of airport lounges' eligibility as concessions, and airport sponsors inconsistently populating data fields for Concession Plans. Despite these inconsistencies we did not identify any significant improper rent economic relief payments in our review sample.

FAA has reduced unsupported and questioned costs and improper payments for ACRGP and ARGP, so we did not make new recommendations.

FAA's Oversight Processes for Identifying and Resolving Boeing Production Issues Are Not Effective (issued October 9, 2024)

Aviation safety is FAA's primary mission, and FAA's oversight of passenger aircraft in the United States includes ensuring that aircraft manufacturers meet requirements when producing new aircraft. However, since 2018, Boeing has experienced multiple manufacturing issues, in addition to complaints alleging ongoing production deficiencies and undue pressure on staff. In response to these concerns, the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and its Subcommittee on Aviation and the Chair of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation requested this audit. Our objective was to evaluate FAA's oversight of Boeing's production of 737 and

787 aircraft, specifically its processes for (1) identifying and resolving production issues and (2) addressing allegations of undue pressure within the production environment.

We found weaknesses in FAA's oversight processes and systems limit its ability to identify and resolve Boeing production issues. FAA's approach to oversight of Boeing's manufacturing and production does not use data-driven assessments to target audits, and FAA has not structured its audits to perform comprehensive assessments. FAA has not adequately ensured that Boeing and its suppliers can produce parts that conform to the approved design. FAA does not require its inspectors to review First Article Inspections that are intended to ensure that a manufacturer's processes can, at the outset, produce parts that meet engineering and design requirements. Furthermore, FAA's compliance system cannot track milestones or determine whether repetitive noncompliance has occurred. FAA also has not assessed the effectiveness of Boeing's Safety Management System. Finally, FAA has not established criteria to return delegated authority to Boeing's Organization Designation Authorization (ODA). Additionally, we found that FAA continues to face challenges addressing allegations of undue pressure within Boeing's aircraft manufacturing. FAA issued guidance for reporting to FAA allegations of interference. However, FAA has not enforced requirements that Boeing provide information in sufficient detail on undue pressure allegations. Additionally, changes to FAA's review process have delayed FAA's ability to resolve allegations of undue pressure reported by Boeing. Furthermore, despite FAA's organizational changes to improve oversight, FAA managers did not know about the investigations of undue pressure allegations when they initiated a request to expand the authorized functions of Boeing's ODA.

We made 16 recommendations to improve FAA oversight of Boeing aircraft production.

Sixteen-Year Sentence Imposed in Conspiracy to Illegally Register Aircraft To Facilitate Transnational Drug Trafficking and Other Crimes

On November 20, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas sentenced an owner of an aircraft title company and aircraft guaranty holdings corporation to 16 years in Federal prison, 5 years of supervised release, and a \$400 special assessment.

In May 2023, the owner was found guilty of conspiracy to commit money laundering and wire fraud, conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to manufacture and distribute cocaine knowing it would be imported into the United States.

The investigation revealed that the owner and others carried out a scheme to further international drug trafficking by registering an aircraft with FAA while concealing that foreign nationals owned the aircraft. They also falsely claimed they would adhere to all regulatory and statutory requirements.

California Man Sentenced Following Convictions Related to Unauthorized Tandem Skydiving Instructor Courses

On September 30, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California sentenced an individual to 24 months of imprisonment, 36 months of supervised release, and a \$200 special assessment. In May 2024, a Federal jury in the same court found the individual guilty of wire fraud and aggravated identity theft related to tandem skydiving instructor courses.

The investigation revealed that from May 2016 through August 2016, the individual fraudulently claimed to be an instructor for courses through which instructor candidates could obtain their tandem instructor ratings. In August 2015, his certification to conduct courses was suspended but he continued to charge candidates between \$1,000 and \$1,600 to attend the courses. He also provided candidates with fraudulent paperwork that included another individual's signature in the space for a certified tandem instructor's signature even though this individual was not present during the training as required.

Alaskan Individual Sentenced for Serving as an Airman Without a Pilot's Certificate and Aircraft Registration Fraud

On September 10, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska sentenced an individual to 20 months in prison, 2 years of supervised release, \$1,000 in restitution, and a \$200 special assessment. On June 6, 2024, the individual pleaded guilty to charges of serving as an airman without a pilot's certificate and aircraft registration fraud. The investigation revealed that in February 2022, he piloted a U.S. registered aircraft without an airman's certificate at an airport in Wasilla, Alaska, and crashed during takeoff. He also displayed a false or misleading registration mark on the aircraft.

Federal Highway Administration

FHWA Lacks Adequate Guidance and Procedures for Its Oversight of Construction Quality Assurance (issued February 18, 2025)

We conducted this audit because of increased funding, rising prices, supply chain challenges, and construction workforce shortages. These issues amplify the importance of FHWA's oversight to ensure the quality of construction materials and workmanship on Federal-aid highway projects. Our objective was to evaluate FHWA's construction quality assurance oversight activities. Specifically, we assessed: (1) the 52 FHWA Divisions' oversight of State Department of Transportation (State DOT) construction quality assurance programs, (2) FHWA Headquarters' construction quality assurance reviews, and (3) FHWA's dissemination of construction quality assurance information on the Agency's public website.

We found that FHWA's Divisions do not effectively oversee State DOTs' construction quality assurance programs. The Divisions could not demonstrate that they fully approved all their State DOTs' construction quality assurance programs as required for projects on the National Highway System. The Divisions also lack guidance from Headquarters on how to review State DOTs' program implementation. Furthermore, FHWA Headquarters has not provided sufficient guidance to the Divisions on how to adequately oversee certifications of project materials and construction inspections. The guidance on how to oversee certifications of project materials lacked detail and the guidance to oversee construction inspections was outdated. Additionally, FHWA Headquarters' reviews of State DOTs' construction quality assurance programs do not fully address compliance and fraud risk. FHWA Headquarters conducts two reviews of State DOT construction quality assurance programs—one that assesses State DOT practices and compliance, and one that evaluates programs' effectiveness and how they minimize risk for fraud, waste, and abuse. However, the first review does not fully address all regulatory requirements for the programs and the second does not address how the programs help minimize risk for waste, fraud, and abuse.

Finally, FHWA’s public webpages on construction quality assurance contain outdated and incomplete information. For instance, FHWA’s Policy and Guidance Center website, the central source of policy and guidance documents, has two webpages on construction quality assurance, but neither includes all relevant documents.

We made 13 recommendations to improve FHWA’s oversight of State DOTs’ quality assurance programs.

A More Systematic Approach Is Needed To Identify Anticompetitive Bidding on Federal-Aid Highway Projects (issued February 12, 2025)

Federal law generally requires States to award contracts for Federal-aid highway projects through competitive bidding. However, concerns about anticompetitive bidding practices in highway procurements have existed for decades. Because of the importance of competition in highway procurement and the low number of studies that have attempted to assess it, we undertook this audit. Our objective was to inform FHWA’s guidance how to prevent and detect anticompetitive practices. Specifically, we (1) assessed competition in procurement for Federal-aid highway projects using statistical methods, (2) provided estimates of the effects on contract costs when certain anticompetitive practices occur, and (3) identified opportunities to improve FHWA’s guidance for preventing and detecting anticompetitive practices.

Our analyses found significant indications of possible complementary bidding on highway procurements. At least one third of the contracts we analyzed using machine learning in Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina were possibly affected by complementary bidding. Our conservative, econometric method also flagged significant possible complementary bidding in most States we examined, affirming the machine learning results. Contracts identified as possibly affected by complementary bidding had higher costs, but separate analyses of firms in flagged pairs found limited evidence of their affecting costs. We estimated that the costs of flagged contracts ranged from an average of 5.2 percent to 10.2 percent higher, depending on the State, than for comparable possibly competitive contracts. Cumulatively, these estimated cost increases amount to \$1.19 billion (in 2021 dollars), or a 6.9 percent cost increase in the Federal-aid highway contracts flagged by our analyses across the six States. While FHWA has improved its guidance for preventing anticompetitive practices, our analysis shows a more systematic approach to detection is needed. FHWA’s guidance during our review period did not adequately support State DOTs’ prevention or identification of anticompetitive practices. Although improved, FHWA’s current guidance continues to lack explicit direction for frequent, regular, and systematic analysis.

We made one recommendation to improve State DOTs’ capabilities to detect and mitigate anticompetitive bidding.

DOT Needs To Increase Adherence to Cybersecurity Policies To Protect FHWA’s IT Infrastructure From the Risk of Further Compromise (issued November 25, 2024)

FHWA’s information systems support mission processes that aid in grant management, infrastructure inspections, inventory management, and research and development. Protecting these systems and the information stored in them prevents unauthorized access

and compromise. This audit is the fourth in a series of reviews to determine whether DOT has the security controls in place to protect its networks and information systems from unauthorized access. Our objectives were to determine whether security weaknesses exist in FHWA's IT infrastructure that could lead to the compromise of the Agency's IT systems and data. Specifically, we reviewed FHWA's (1) adherence to cybersecurity policies and (2) compliance with the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and its cybersecurity incident response procedures.

We found DOT's lack of adherence to cybersecurity policies allowed us to gain unauthorized access into FHWA's network. FHWA and DOT's OCIO do not remediate vulnerabilities in FHWA's IT infrastructure according to policy. OCIO had not implemented the required network boundary protection controls, allowing us to access FAA's intranet site and sensitive proprietary data. FHWA did not replace default credentials in its information systems, allowing us to access network printers and sensitive information. We also used open-source tools to crack and use weak and known passwords to compromise and penetrate FHWA IT infrastructure and gain access to two FHWA servers and an OCIO server. Additionally, we found that DOT and FHWA officials did not consult with us in accordance with the ROE for the audit, and did not fully follow DOT's incident response procedures, preventing us from completing our testing activities. After we gained unauthorized access to three DOT servers, DOT disconnected one and started decommissioning the other two without consulting with us, as required by the ROE. According to DOT officials, FHWA and OCIO technicians did not notify us because they did not recognize us as the source of scanning and other intrusion attempts. However, had DOT followed its incident response procedures, it could have identified us as an intruder and notified us that they were aware of our intrusion so that we could consult and then complete further testing. As a result of these actions, we were unable to determine whether FHWA's IT infrastructure is at risk for further compromised.

We made eight recommendations to improve OCIO's IT security posture providing IT shared services to FHWA's IT infrastructure.

President of Michigan Asphalt Company Sentenced for Role in Bid Rigging Conspiracy

On March 18, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan sentenced the president of a construction company to 24 months of probation, a \$100,000 fine, and a \$200 special assessment. In August 2023, he pleaded guilty to two bid rigging conspiracies. The investigation revealed that as early as June 2013 and until at least May 2021, he conspired with another company and co-conspirators to eliminate competition by agreeing to rig bids for contracts to provide asphalt paving services in Michigan.

Virginia Company Agrees to Civil Settlement to Resolve Allegations of Violating the False Claims Act

On December 31, 2024, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia and the U.S. Department of Justice entered into a civil settlement agreement with a Virginia-based information technology and services company. The company agreed to pay \$2,627,332 to resolve civil False Claims Act allegations.

The investigation found that the company took various steps to conceal total revenue amounts from Federal agencies to fraudulently qualify for and receive a General Services Administration One Acquisition Solution for Integrated Services Small Business contract, a small business set-aside contract that provides qualifying businesses the opportunity to execute contracts at the task order level. Under this contract, from November 2019 to April 2022, the company invoiced approximately \$31,473,743 to various Federal agencies. Of relevance to DOT, through these invoices, the investigation identified a contract awarded by FHWA that the company was not legally entitled to receive.

Former Managers Sentenced for Long-Running Bid-Rigging Conspiracy in Georgia Concrete Industry

On October 17, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia sentenced an individual to 41 months in prison, 3 years of supervised release, a \$50,000 fine, and a \$100 special assessment. On the same day, a co-conspirator was also sentenced to 26 months in prison, 3 years of supervised release, a \$10,000 fine, and a \$100 special assessment.

In July 2024, the co-conspirators were convicted for their roles in a conspiracy to fix prices, rig bids, and allocate markets for the sale of ready-mix concrete in Georgia and South Carolina. Beginning as early as 2010 until about July 2016, the co-conspirators violated the Sherman Act by coordinating price increase letters to customers, allocating specific jobs in the coastal Georgia area, and submitting bids to customers at collusive and noncompetitive prices.

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

FMCSA's Procedures To Oversee IIJA-Funded Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program Grants Are Insufficient (issued April 23, 2025)

FMCSA reported that 5,176 fatalities involving large trucks and buses occurred in 2023. To reduce these incidents, FMCSA provides Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) formula grants to State agencies. IIJA authorized over \$2 billion in appropriations for MCSAP grants and up to \$400 million in supplemental funds. Our audit objective was to evaluate FMCSA's MCSAP grant oversight activities. Specifically, we reviewed FMCSA's (1) policies and procedures for monitoring MCSAP grant recipients, (2) annual risk assessments and monitoring plans for MCSAP recipients, and (3) tracking of recipients' achievement of safety goals.

We found that FMCSA's Division Offices do not always follow the Agency's policies and procedures for monitoring MCSAP grants. FMCSA's guidelines on Division Offices' reviews of grantees' MCSAP reimbursement requests are insufficient and outdated. The guidelines for MCSAP process reviews, program reviews, and onsite monitoring activities lack detail and clarity. The guidelines for documentation and supervision of analyses of MCSAP grantees' quarterly reports are unclear. Additionally, we found FMCSA's annual risk assessments and monitoring plans do not sufficiently account for MCSAP-related grant risks. Annual risk assessments do not consider MCSAP specific issues and the Agency's guidelines are insufficient. FMCSA's Division Office monitoring plans do not always meet minimum requirements and lacks sufficient guidelines for completion. Finally, we found

FMCSA faces challenges prioritizing Commercial Vehicle Safety Plan (CVSP) goals and performance tracking. FMCSA does not prioritize analyses of States' performance of CVSP goals, and tracking them presents challenges.

We made five recommendations to improve FMCSA's oversight of MCSAP grants.

New York Motor Carrier Owner Sentenced for Conspiracy and Fraud

On March 20, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York sentenced an owner of two New York-based trucking businesses to 45 months of incarceration, 24 months of supervised release, a \$150,000 fine, and a \$700 special assessment.

In June 2024, the owner was found guilty of conspiracy, false documents, false statements, falsification of records, and concealment of material facts. The owner conspired with others to devise a scheme to defraud FMCSA. They attempted to conceal from FMCSA that he owned and managed a company. They also concealed that the company was affiliated with other corporate entities he used that had received a "conditional" FMCSA safety rating. A conditional rating means a motor carrier does not have adequate safety management controls in place to meet the safety fitness standard.

According to witness testimony at trial, by obtaining a more favorable safety rating, the company lowered its insurance premium and increased its revenue from customers, some of whom were unwilling to use a motor carrier with a conditional safety rating. To further the scheme, he submitted required forms to FMCSA that falsely represented that the company's principal address was in Dallas, Texas, among other bogus addresses.

Moving Company Employees Sentenced and Ordered To Pay \$1.8 Million in Restitution Related to Fraud Scheme

On February 19, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced a moving company employee to 2 years of incarceration, 1 year of supervised release, \$30,000 in forfeiture, and a \$100 special assessment for conspiracy to commit wire fraud in connection with a fraudulent moving company scheme.

Between at least January 2017 and August 2020, the employees worked for multiple moving companies that operated under various names. A customer service representative for the companies, and a member of the sales team supervised by the customer service representative, lured customers to the movers by posting fake reviews online and directing sales associates to low-ball the costs of moving household goods. After customers signed contracts and, in some cases, after movers loaded customers' belongings onto trucks, the movers would add new fees. Customers could not reach the sales associates about the additional fees and drivers threatened to hold customers' goods hostage unless they paid them. The court ordered four defendants to pay \$1,795,950 in restitution, apportioned evenly among their victims.

Trucking Company Owner Sentenced for Bribery Scheme

On October 1, 2024, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, a trucking company owner pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and was sentenced to 3 years of probation, including 6 months of home detention, \$1,378,702 in restitution, \$6,754,845 in forfeiture, and a \$100 special assessment.

The defendant and other individuals owned a trucking group comprised of several trucking companies that contracted to carry packages for FedEx Ground (FXG). The investigation revealed that the trucking group paid bribes to FXG employees who manipulated FXG's process governing the awarding of new runs. An employee helped the co-conspirators grow their business larger than FXG allowed by submitting false information to FXG. During the conspiracy, which lasted approximately 10 years, the trucking group received about \$108 million in FXG revenue.

Federal Railroad Administration

FRA Lacks Written Procedures and Formal Planning for Oversight of Railroad Hours of Service Compliance and the Passenger Railroad Fatigue Management Requirements
(issued March 27, 2024)

FRA's recent data show that human factors, including fatigue, remain the leading cause of reportable non-grade crossing train accidents. In particular, the rate of human factor-caused train accidents reached a 14-year high of 1.43 per million train miles in 2022. According to FRA, overseeing railroad fatigue management and compliance with Federal Hours of Service (HOS) requirements is part of the Agency's ongoing effort to address the adverse impacts and underlying causes of fatigue in the railroad industry. Given these factors, we assessed FRA's (1) oversight of HOS compliance, (2) pursuit of civil penalties for HOS violations, and (3) oversight of passenger railroad compliance with fatigue management requirements.

Three FRA staff persons in two divisions—the HOS subject matter expert (SME) and two fatigue SMEs—oversee HOS compliance and fatigue management for the entire railroad industry. The oversight processes and analyses are not fully documented and there is no evidence of risk-based planning. Specifically, FRA has no detailed procedures documenting how its staff plan and perform oversight of HOS compliance or required analyses of passenger railroad work schedules and fatigue mitigation plans. FRA also lacks guidance for many HOS violation penalty amounts as well as procedures for producing accurate Annual Enforcement Reports. As a result, FRA does not have the procedures and accurate data necessary to effectively target its limited resources to the highest risk areas or adequately oversee different railroad types.

We made 19 recommendations to improve FRA's oversight of HOS and fatigue management.

Former New York MTA Signal Inspector Sentenced for Making False Railroad Inspection Report

On January 10, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced a former signal inspector for the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) Long Island Railroad (LIRR) to 1 year of probation and a \$100 special court assessment.

The signal inspector pleaded guilty to making a false entry in a report that LIRR maintains to comply with Federal laws governing railroad safety and operations. According to court filings, the signal inspector regularly inspected rail bonds—electronic jumpers around joints in the railroad track to ensure continuous conductivity for signal currents. On April 26, 2019, he falsely indicated in an inspection report that a rail bond inspection had been completed in Speonk, New York, and that the bond had passed inspection. In May 2019, a westbound

LIRR train collided with an eastbound train in Speonk. A subsequent LIRR investigation determined that the rail bond that he had falsely indicated had been inspected in April 2019, was broken and the broken rail bond caused the signal malfunction and the derailment.

New York City Individual Sentenced to 30 Years in Connection With Amtrak Ticketing Fraud and Child Exploitation

On November 14, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced an individual to 30 years in prison, 5 years of supervised release, \$468,037 in restitution to Amtrak, and a \$100 special court assessment.

From April 2016 through July 2018, the individual and others engaged in a scheme to defraud Amtrak and consumers using unauthorized or stolen credit card numbers to make unauthorized Amtrak reservations. The scammers then cancelled or exchanged those reservations for eVouchers, later selling the eVouchers online at a discount. Amtrak used FRA grant funds to upgrade its computer ticketing system, which includes the eVoucher system.

The individual also coerced or enticed a minor to engage in sexual acts, as defined in the Mann Act.

Federal Transit Administration

FTA's Oversight of Region 9 Recipients Is Insufficient To Confirm Compliance With CARES Act Funding Requirements (issued May 21, 2024)

FTA received \$25 billion from the CARES Act to help the Nation's public transit agencies mitigate the impacts of COVID-19. FTA obligated over \$4.4 billion of this funding to recipients within FTA's Region 9, which contains the 4th, 10th, and 11th highest FTA CARES Act fund recipients nationwide. While the Agency expanded its oversight of COVID-19 relief funding recipients, we had previously found risks associated with these activities and FTA's oversight of contract and grant expenditures. Given our previous findings and the magnitude of taxpayer funds involved, we initiated this audit to assess FTA's oversight of its Region 9 recipients' compliance with CARES Act funding requirements. Specifically, we evaluated (1) FTA's oversight processes relevant to Region 9 CARES Act payments, and (2) the eligibility of CARES Act payments for a statistical sample of eight Region 9 recipients.

FTA conducts limited oversight of its Region 9 recipients' CARES Act payments. Specifically, the Agency has not amended its standard automated grant payment process to account for elevated CARES Act fund risks and relies on contractor-conducted oversight reviews that are insufficiently scoped to identify CARES Act funding noncompliance. Furthermore, despite FTA's encouraging recipients to use these funds expeditiously, FTA Region 9 funds remain unexpended. These limited oversight activities put the Agency at greater risk that its CARES Act funds will be subject to fraud and misuse. For instance, we identified a total of \$192.8 million in unsupported costs and \$4.2 million in ineligible expenses associated with CARES Act payments for six of the eight sample Region 9 recipients tested. These issues occurred in part because of FTA's limited oversight and broad eligibility guidance. Overall, we estimate that FTA paid up to \$340 million in unsupported

costs and \$106.9 million in ineligible expenses across Region 9 CARES Act recipients—totaling \$446.9 million in Federal funds at risk.

We made four recommendations to strengthen FTA’s oversight of its recipients’ compliance with CARES Act funding requirements.

FTA’s Oversight of Federally Funded Real Property Is Insufficient To Ensure Grant Recipients Meet Federal Reporting and Disposal Requirements (issued May 20, 2024)

In a typical year, FTA awards over \$20 billion in grants for transit system development and improvement, including the purchase of real property for bus facilities, bus rapid transit, light rail, heavy rail, and commuter rail projects. Through IIJA, Congress authorized as much as \$108.1 billion to FTA to improve public transportation systems throughout the country. Given FTA’s large investment in these transit projects, we initiated this audit. Our audit objectives were to assess FTA’s oversight of grant recipients’ (1) reporting and (2) disposal of real property funded with FTA grant assistance.

FTA cannot identify all reportable real property associated with its grants, and real property data depend primarily on recipients’ self-reporting. Additionally, FTA does not conduct real property oversight reviews of all grant recipients with reportable property. FTA also does not enforce its requirement for recipients to maintain real property inventories or verify that their inventories include all reportable Federal interest. Furthermore, FTA does not enforce a regulatory requirement for recipients to submit annual reports on real property. Lastly, FTA’s oversight of real property disposition is inadequate to ensure recipients comply with disposal requirements. One grantee disposed of 62 properties without informing FTA because the grantee was unaware of whether an FTA financial interest existed in any of the properties. FTA’s insufficient oversight of reportable real property creates a higher risk that property will be disposed of without consideration for FTA’s financial interest.

We made eight recommendations to improve FTA’s oversight of real property reporting and improve accountability.

Government Employees Sentenced for Conspiring To Defraud WMATA and the District of Columbia

On October 25, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced an individual to 18 months in prison, 36 months of supervised release, a \$200 special assessment, and \$150,000 in restitution. The individual conspired with two local Government officials to defraud the District of Columbia and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) of money, property, and their employees’ honest services. As a result of the conspiracy, a private company owned and operated by the individual improperly received over \$1 million.

On October 21, in a related case, a co-defendant, who had already pleaded guilty to conspiring with the individual to defraud the District of Columbia and WMATA, was sentenced to 7 months in prison and 2 years of supervised release. The co-defendant was also ordered to forfeit a car obtained with proceeds of the conspiracy and to pay \$100,000 in restitution.

According to court documents, during the conspiracy, which was carried out between 2018 and 2023, the individual was employed at the U.S. Department of Agriculture while separately acting as a company's principal. The co-defendant was a public employee who managed contracts at the District of Columbia's Office of Contracting and Procurement (OCP) and, before that, WMATA. The individual provided money and other things of value to a former WMATA employee to steer WMATA and District of Columbia Government contracts to the company.

In January 2021, OCP began the process of helping the District of Columbia's Department of Forensic Sciences hire a vendor to provide COVID 19 testing supplies. In the co-defendant's official capacity at OCP, she managed contract solicitations, offers, and awards. She alerted the individual and the former WMATA employee to the contracting opportunity; provided them with non-public information about the solicitation, such as contract pricing; and steered the contract towards the company. The District of Columbia ultimately paid the company over \$630,000 under the contract. In return, the individual paid the former WMATA employee over \$100,000 and instructed the former WMATA employee to give \$15,000 of the money in cash to the co-defendant in exchange for the corrupt acts.

Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation

New York Contractor Sentenced in Connection with Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Business Fraud and Related Crimes

On May 16, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York sentenced an owner of two companies to 2 years of probation, \$345,271 in restitution to the U.S. Army, and a \$200 special assessment. The owner had previously pleaded guilty to an information charging conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to bribe a public official.

According to court filings, the owner conspired to fraudulently obtain Government contracts set aside for service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs) that the company was not eligible to obtain. The owner's company received over \$3 million from various U.S. Army contracts and nearly \$308,000 from a contract with GLS. All the contracts were designated for SDVOSBs. The owner also bribed a U.S. Army contracting officer with tangible and intangible things of value in exchange for preferential treatment. The owner and other parties previously agreed to pay the United States \$758,526 to resolve their civil liability for False Claims Act fraud.

Maritime Administration

MARAD Has Not Established a Compliant Information Management System for USMMA's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program (issued December 4, 2024)

The 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required MARAD to establish for the USMMA's Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program an information management system for sexual assault and sexual harassment claims. The Act also requires OIG to conduct a cybersecurity audit of this system. Accordingly, our audit objectives were to (1) determine whether MARAD has implemented an information management system for the SAPR Program that complies with NDAA requirements and (2) assess the system's cybersecurity and privacy controls.

We found MARAD has not established an information management system that complies with NDAA requirements. Instead of acquiring a new information management system, USMMA uses a spreadsheet system for the SAPR Program. USMMA officials acknowledged that this spreadsheet system does not meet the Academy's needs. The SAPR Program tracks and maintains most but not all required information in its spreadsheet system. The program also has not implemented a process to update the records of acquitted individuals in its spreadsheet system. Additionally, we found the SAPR Program's spreadsheet system lacks sufficient cybersecurity and privacy controls. The program's spreadsheet system lacks the cybersecurity controls required by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and DOT's Cybersecurity Compendium to properly secure and protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the program's sensitive data and information. MARAD's Privacy Officer has not analyzed the spreadsheet system to determine what privacy protections should be implemented to protect personally identifiable information stored in the system.

We made four recommendations to improve MARAD's oversight of USMMA's SAPR Program.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Former Indiana Deputy Sheriff Sentenced for Official Misconduct

On January 13, 2025, a former Deputy Sheriff was sentenced in the Superior Court for the 81st Judicial Circuit in Lawrence County, Indiana, to 1 day of incarceration, 30 months of supervised release, 80 hours of community service, \$41,672 in restitution to the Indiana Criminal Justice Institute, and \$469 in court fees. The individual had previously pleaded guilty to one count of official misconduct related to theft of NHTSA grant money.

Beginning in 2017, the former Deputy served as the NHTSA grant administrator for the Lawrence County Sheriff's Office. After he retired in 2021, an audit revealed that he worked approximately 1,335 overtime hours funded by NHTSA grants. However, he did not submit accurate, or in some cases any, supporting documentation to prove the reported hours were accurate. In total, he received \$41,672 in fraudulent payments.

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

New York Individual Convicted of Reckless Violation of Transportation Safety Regulations

On November 22, 2024, a jury in the U.S. District Court of Maryland found an individual guilty of one count of illegal distribution and sale of an unregistered pesticide and one count of reckless violation of transportation safety regulations.

On or about September 29, 2021, the individual knowingly distributed and sold a pesticide that was not registered with the Environmental Protection Agency under the Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide and Fungicide Act. The individual also recklessly violated transportation safety regulations by failing to maintain required shipping papers to transport hazardous substances inside their vehicle.

Pennsylvania Individual Convicted and Sentenced in Connection With Interstate Pipeline Project

On October 11, 2024, a company owner was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County, Pennsylvania, of one count each of forgery, theft by deception, and causing or risking a catastrophe. On the same date, the Court sentenced the individual to 3 years of probation on each count to run concurrently and ordered him to pay a \$250 fine and the costs of the prosecution in money or community service as determined by the County Adult Probation Office.

The transportation safety investigation revealed that the individual was hired as an industrial radiographer to x-ray and interpret welds on sections of an interstate pipeline to evaluate their integrity. He provided forged and false certifications to misrepresent that he was a licensed industrial radiographer and charged the company for this work. Furthermore, the individual performed testing of welds on pipeline components while not properly certified to do so and falsified reader sheets on the pipeline project.

What benefits will be provided to the American public through this request and why is this program necessary?

OIG's mission is to enhance DOT's programs and operations by conducting objective investigations and audits on behalf of the American public. Our work provides value for the American taxpayer by promoting economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of DOT's programs; preventing and detecting fraud, waste, and abuse; and keeping the Secretary and Congress fully and currently informed.

OIG is the only source of internal, independent, and objective recommendations on departmental programs for DOT's senior executives and managers. Working closely with Congress, the Secretary, and senior DOT officials, we focus on issues that impact public safety, strive to enhance the effectiveness and integrity of DOT's programs, and seek out the best use of taxpayer dollars through savings, recoveries, and efficiency.

Our audit recommendations lead to substantial financial, programmatic, and safety improvements. Our investigations enhance safety by thwarting criminal activities that put lives at risk and protect taxpayer investments through court-ordered fines, restitutions, recoveries, and forfeitures. In FY 2024, we issued 41 audit reports with 186 recommendations, and our investigations led to 74 convictions and 82 indictments. From FY 2020 through FY 2024, we achieved an average ROI of \$26 to \$1.

Section 5: Information Technology

FY 2026 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY BUDGET REQUEST
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
BUDGET AUTHORITY
(\$000)

Budget Account	FY 2024 Actual	FY 2025 Enacted	FY 2026 Pres. Budget
Salaries & Expenses			
<i>Commodity IT SS WCF</i>	\$3,710	\$2,335	\$2,335
<i>Modal IT</i>	\$11,308	\$13,602	\$13,848
Total	\$15,018	\$15,937	\$16,183

OIG is requesting **\$16.2 million** in FY 2026 for IT that supports the full spectrum of OIG programs as well as the Department’s initiative to transform and consolidate the management of certain IT solutions centrally by OCIO.

Commodity IT Shared Services (SS) through the Working Capital Fund

OCIO will continue to provide all modes with Commodity IT Shared Services in FY 2026 to achieve economies of scale and increase consistency of cybersecurity protections across the Department. Commodity IT Shared Services include IT functions and activities dedicated to basic support services, including network operations, end-user computing, telecommunications services, and server operations.

- OIG requests **\$2.3 million** from the Salaries & Expenses account for Commodity IT Shared Services. OIG’s share is based on actual commodity IT consumption in prior years as well as planned future consumption. OCIO, in collaboration with OIG, assumes a one-to-one cost estimate to transition all commodity IT to OCIO. OIG will only be charged for services rendered.

Modal IT

The following major mission-critical IT systems will be maintained by OIG in FY 2026. This list is a subset of IT systems that support OIG and are reported in the Corporate Investment Management System.

- **General Support, Maintenance of Network ADP, Hardware, and Software** - OIG requests **\$9.0 million** for development, modernization, and enhancement (DME) and operation and maintenance (O&M) of mission critical resources for OIG’s primary IT infrastructure platform. These resources are fundamental and provide a secure, flexible, and robust structure to support OIG’s workforce including mission critical audit, data analytics, and investigative staff.
- **Audit Information Security Lab** - OIG requests **\$1.0 million** for DME and O&M of mission critical resources for computer security audit activities including penetration testing and vulnerability assessments of departmental and modal IT systems.

- **Data Analytics and Computer Crimes Unit** - OIG requests **\$3.9 million** for DME and O&M of mission critical resources to support OIG's investigative activities by providing specialized and enhanced investigative techniques utilizing data analytics and developing and adapting mathematical, statistical, econometric, and other analytical solutions for OIG operations.

Section 6: 10-Year Funding Table

**FY 2017 – FY 2026 FUNDING HISTORY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
SALARIES AND EXPENSES**

Request		Appropriation
2017	\$ 90,152,000	2017.....\$ 90,152,000
2018	\$ 90,152,000	2018.....\$ 92,152,000
2019	\$ 91,500,000	2019.....\$ 92,600,000
2020	\$ 92,152,000	2020.....\$ 94,600,000
2021.....	\$ 98,150,000	2021.....\$ 98,150,000
2022.....	\$103,150,000	2022.....\$103,150,000
2023.....	\$108,073,000	2023.....\$108,073,000
2024.....	\$121,001,000	2024.....\$116,452,000
2025.....	\$122,176,000	2025.....\$116,452,000
2026.....	\$116,452,000	